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A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO TESTIFY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRESUMING WAIVER 
FROM A SILENT RECORD 
ABSTRACT 
 
The area of criminal law is constantly being refined and developed.  At 
trial, criminal defendants are often faced with the potential reality of 
waiving their most basic fundamental rights.  As a result, careful 
consideration is necessary when analyzing a waiver of these rights.  In Rock 
v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments guaranteed a criminal defendant the right to testify at trial on 
his own behalf.  But where courts require criminal defendants to 
affirmatively waive most of their constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as 
the right to an attorney or the right to a jury trial, most circuit courts, as well 
as the state of North Dakota, do not require criminal defendants to 
affirmatively waive their constitutionally guaranteed right to testify at their 
own criminal trial.  Instead, courts presume a waiver has occurred when, at 
the trial’s conclusion, the defendant’s attorney has rested the case without 
the defendant having testified.  This Article discusses the dangers of this 
presumption, including an analysis of the evolution of a criminal 
defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights.  When freedom is at stake, it 
is important for criminal defendants to receive their full day in court.  In 
light of the vulnerable position they find themselves, it is imperative for 
criminal defendants to retain the ability to fully exercise their 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal law is inherently interesting.  People are fascinated with the 
facts underlying criminal cases.  The constitutional protections afforded to 
criminal defendants, however, often take a backseat to the details 
surrounding the criminal act.  Many criminal defendants are not aware of 
our most basic rights in the criminal setting, such as the right to an attorney 
or the right to a jury trial.1  These basic constitutional rights are of the 
 
1.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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utmost importance considering that a person’s freedom is in jeopardy 
should they be found guilty.  Because of the importance of defendants’ 
rights in the criminal setting, this is an area of law that is constantly 
evolving and being perpetually developed and refined.2 
Unlike the right to a jury trial or the right to an attorney, the criminal 
defendant’s right to testify is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the 
Constitution or its Amendments.  In Rock v. Arkansas,3 however, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a criminal 
defendant the right to testify at trial on his own behalf, holding “[t]here is 
no justification today for a rule that denies an accused the opportunity to 
offer his own testimony.”4  Since this decision, courts have disagreed in 
interpreting how a defendant may waive this constitutionally protected 
right.5  Although courts agree that in order to waive the right to testify, a 
criminal defendant must do so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently,6 
courts disagree on how to apply this standard.  Today, most courts hold that 
a defendant’s right to testify is waived if the defendant has not testified by 
the end of trial.7  If the defendant himself does not make an objection on the 
record, it is presumed that he has waived that right.8  In other words, courts 
simply assume a defendant has waived his right to testify absent any sort of 
record or confirmation that the defendant actually wishes to waive this very 
important right. 
There are several problems with this approach.  First, defendants do not 
usually address the court directly.  Rather, it is their attorney who does so.  
If a defendant speaks, he often faces swift reprimand from the court.9  
Second, defendants and their attorneys also often disagree on whether it 
would be beneficial for the defendant to testify on his own behalf, and it is 
 
2.  See, e.g., United States v. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2151 (2013) (holding that any fact 
that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an actual element of the crime and 
must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 
545 (2002)). 
3.  483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
4.  Id. at 49-53. 
5.  See United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 (11th 
Cir. 1991); Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1989).  But see United States v. 
Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989), 
vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). 
6.  See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756 (requiring a waiver of the right to testify to be “intentional 
and to be intentional must be known to the one who gives it up”); Teague, 908 F.2d at 759 (waiver 
must be “knowing, voluntary[,] and intelligent”); United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 
1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (waiver of the right must be “knowing and intentional”). 
7.  See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760; Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751-52; Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d at 
1094-95. 
8.  Pino-Noriega, 189 F.2d at 1094-95. 
9.  Martinez, 883 F.2d at 770 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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obvious that attorneys are in a position of power over the defendants, as 
they speak directly to the court and are more knowledgeable in criminal law 
and procedure.  Third, because attorneys have the responsibility to advise 
the defendant of his right to testify, whether or not it is wise to do so, as 
well as the strategic implications of that decision,10 attorneys may pressure 
and advise their clients not to testify even when the defendant may 
desperately wish to do so.  Because of criminal defendants’ general lack of 
knowledge of the law and the vulnerable position they find themselves in at 
their own criminal trial, it is irresponsible for courts to assume defendants 
have waived their constitutionally guaranteed right to testify without 
making an affirmative record of him or her doing so.  This is especially true 
in light of the fact that an affirmative record must be made of defendants 
waiving other constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to an 
attorney and the right to a jury trial.11 
This Note will examine several of these issues.  It will examine the 
problems associated with presuming a waiver of the right to testify from a 
silent record.  It will discuss several constitutional rights guaranteed to 
criminal defendants, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel and 
the right to a jury trial.  It also examines how courts approach the waiver of 
these constitutional rights versus the current approach of assuming a 
defendant has waived the right to testify when the record is silent on the 
issue. 
After a historical and procedural analysis of these constitutional rights 
in the criminal setting, this Note proposes a simple solution to the 
inconsistencies surrounding the waiver of a defendant’s constitutional right 
to testify.  Specifically, a judge may simply ask the defendant, outside the 
presence of the jury, if he or she wishes to testify.  An affirmative record of 
this interaction between the defendant and the court ultimately may 
safeguard this fundamental, constitutionally guaranteed right and facilitate 
effective communication in the attorney-client relationship.  Courtroom 
efficiency would also benefit, as there will no longer be doubt as to whether 
a defendant was denied his right to testify, thereby eliminating the grounds 
for an appeal on the issue.  In order to fully understand the many 
constitutional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants, a comparison of 
these rights and how they have evolved is an important starting point. 
 
10.  United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992). 
11.  See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 
512-13 (1962). 
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II. THE DEFENDANT’S FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS IN THE CRIMINAL SETTING 
This section explores, compares, and contrasts several rights 
guaranteed to criminal defendants through the Constitution and its 
Amendments.  The right to an attorney and the right to a jury trial, among 
others, are found within the Sixth Amendment, while the right to testify is 
not.  The right to testify, however, is firmly rooted in the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments and is arguably the most important of these rights, 
as evidenced by the language used in several United States Supreme Court 
and circuit court decisions.12 
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states: 
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.13 
The language granting a defendant the right to an attorney is explicit in 
the Sixth Amendment.  In Miranda v. Arizona,14 Chief Justice Warren held 
that the “precious” right to an attorney was “fixed in our Constitution only 
after centuries of persecution and struggle.”15  And in the words of Chief 
Justice Marshall, “[our rights] were secured ‘for ages to come, and designed 
to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach 
it[.]’”16 
In Johnson v. Zerbst,17 the Supreme Court set forth the standard to be 
used in measuring a criminal defendant’s waiver of his or her 
constitutionally guaranteed rights.  “A waiver is . . . an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”18  Further 
 
12.  See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (“[A]n accused’s right to present his 
own version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a personal defense than 
the right of self-representation.”) (emphasis added). 
13.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
14.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
15.  Id. at 442. 
16.  Id.  (quoting Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821)). 
17.  304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
18.  Id. at 464. 
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and specifically regarding the right to counsel, Faretta v. California19 held 
that a defendant must be voluntarily exercising his own free will and must 
knowingly and intelligently relinquish the right to counsel.20  Other 
Supreme Court cases have reiterated this sentiment.21 
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense 
with a lawyer’s help are not legal formalisms.  Such rights rest on 
considerations that go to the substance of an accused’s position before the 
law.  The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates the 
administration of justice.  An accused must have the means of presenting 
his best defense.  He must have time and facilities for investigation and for 
the production of evidence.  Evidence and truth are, however, of no avail 
unless they can be adequately presented.  Essential fairness is lacking if an 
accused cannot put his case effectively in court.  But the Constitution does 
not force a lawyer upon a defendant.  A defendant may waive the 
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing 
and his choice is made with eyes open.22 
It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel is extremely 
important, and the Supreme Court has noted it will not be taken for granted.  
Due to the defendant’s right to counsel being of such importance, the 
Supreme Court has held that a waiver of the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to counsel cannot be implied from a silent record.23  “The record must 
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an 
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected 
the offer.  Anything less is not waiver.”24  Much like this fundamental right 
to counsel, the right to a trial by jury has also been found to be of 
significant importance in the eyes of the Supreme Court, and it also requires 
an affirmative, on-record waiver in order to be relinquished.25 
 
19.  422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
20.  Id. at 835. 
21.  See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1962) (holding that a defendant must 
intelligently and understandingly waive the fundamental right to counsel); Adams v. United States 
ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942) (holding that a defendant must be competent to make an 
intelligent, informed choice of whether to waive a fundamental right). 
22.  Adams, 317 U.S. at 279. 
23.  See Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516 (holding that “[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is 
impermissible.”). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
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B. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
Like the fundamental right to be assisted by counsel, the right to a jury 
trial is also explicit in the language of the Sixth Amendment.26  Boykin v. 
Alabama27 also held that, much like the fundamental right of assistance of 
counsel, the right to a jury trial cannot be presumed from a silent record.28 
For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of 
conduct; it is a conviction.  Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, 
terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect 
cover-up of unconstitutionality.  The question of an effective 
waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course 
governed by federal standards.29 
Boykin also noted that several constitutional provisions are implicated 
if a defendant seeks to waive the right to a jury trial and enter a guilty 
plea.30  First, the Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory  
self-incrimination is implicated when a defendant chooses to plead guilty.31  
Along with the guarantee of the right to a jury trial, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of the right to confront one’s accusers is also implicated.32  
Further, whether an accused has waived his right to a trial by jury is 
dependent upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case.33 
Boykin then explicitly held that a waiver of all of these fundamental 
rights cannot be presumed from a silent record.34  When a defendant’s life 
and freedom are at stake, courts must be as careful as possible in 
determining whether a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights has taken 
place, and courts must make sure a defendant has a full understanding of the 
consequences of his guilty plea.35  When a judge does these things, an 
adequate record is then preserved, the subsequent conviction is now further 
insulated from burdensome appeals and attacks,36 and the record of the 
conviction is no longer ambiguous.  As Boykin stated, making an 
 
26.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
27.  395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
28.  Id. at 242. 
29.  Id. at 242-43 (internal citation omitted). 
30.  Id. at 243. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942); see also Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). (determining a waiver of a fundamental right 
“depend[s] . . . upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case”). 
34.  Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. 
35.  Id. at 243-44. 
36.  Id. 
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affirmative record of such a waiver “forestalls the spin-off of collateral 
proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.”37 
Both the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial are constitutionally 
guaranteed rights.  These fundamental rights trigger many constitutional 
implications and are protected by several Amendments.38  The criminal 
defendant’s right to testify on his or her own behalf at his or her own trial is 
no different. 
C. CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO TESTIFY ON THEIR  
OWN BEHALF 
The right to testify was not always a guaranteed right.  It was not until 
recently that the Supreme Court officially recognized that the right of a 
criminal defendant to testify on his or her own behalf was fundamental and 
protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.39  In 1864, 
Maine became the first state to adopt a statute establishing criminal 
defendants as competent to offer testimony, and other states followed suit.40  
But the criminal defendant’s right to testify did not become constitutionally 
guaranteed until 1987.41  It was only through statute that the federal 
government granted the right of criminal defendants to testify.42 
Before Rock v. Arkansas held the right to testify to be constitutionally 
guaranteed, the First Circuit, in United States v. Systems Architects, Inc.,43 
ruled on the statutory grant of the right to testify.  Systems Architects held 
that defendants were misguided in asserting that the court had an 
affirmative duty to confirm that defendants had knowingly and intelligently 
waived their right to testify.44  Because the right to testify was not 
constitutionally guaranteed at the time this decision was rendered, the 
 
37.  Id. 
38.  See supra Parts II.A-B. 
39.  See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987). 
40.  See Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 ME. LAWS 214 (codified as amended at ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1315 (2011)). 
41.  See Rock, 483 U.S. at 49-53. 
42.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982)  
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United 
States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State, 
District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a 
competent witness.  His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption 
against him. 
(emphasis added). 
43.  757 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1985). 
44.  Id. at 375. 
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Systems Architects court based its holding and reasoning on the statutory 
grant of the right to testify.45 
In rendering its decision, the First Circuit relied heavily on the actual 
statutory language, which specifically stated that the defendant may testify 
“at his own request.”46  This language led the court to hold that the 
defendant “must act affirmatively” at the time of trial to preserve his right 
to testify.47  The First Circuit’s statement that “[t]here is no constitutional or 
statutory mandate that a trial court inquire further into a defendant’s 
decision to not testify under the facts here” further limited its holding.48  
Because Systems Architects was decided before the right to testify was 
deemed to be fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed, the decision 
only gave a cursory glance at the possible constitutional implications 
regarding a waiver of this right, stating that the “due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment may be understood to grant to the accused the right to 
testify[.]”49 
It was not until two years later that the landmark case of Rock v. 
Arkansas held that criminal defendants have a fundamental and 
constitutionally guaranteed right to testify on their own behalf.50  In Rock, 
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and the Arkansas Supreme 
Court affirmed this conviction.51  The defendant then appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed and remanded the 
case,52 holding that the Arkansas rule excluding the defendant’s 
hypnotically refreshed testimony impermissibly impinged on the 
defendant’s right to testify on her own behalf.53 
Rock noted that the right to testify is derived from the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.54  In recognizing that criminal defendants have a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to testify, as opposed to a statutorily 
guaranteed right to testify, the Supreme Court noted that the right to testify 
is a “necessary ingredient[] of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that 
no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law.”55  The right 
 
45.  Id.; see also supra note 42. 
46.  Sys. Architects, 757 F.2d at 375 (emphasizing the statutory language). 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 376 (emphasis added). 
49.  Id. at 375. 
50.  483 U.S. at 49-53. 
51.  Id. at 44. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. 
55.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 51. 
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to testify is a right that is “essential to due process of law in a fair adversary 
process.”56 
This right is also grounded in the Compulsory Process Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment, which grants an accused the right to call witnesses 
whose testimony is material and favorable to his defense.57  Simply put, the 
Sixth Amendment “grants to the accused personally the right to make his 
defense.”58  Further, the right to testify is “a necessary corollary to the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee against compelled testimony.”59  It is also 
exceedingly important to note that “an accused’s right to present his own 
version of events in his own words” is “[e]ven more fundamental to a 
personal defense than the right of self-representation[.]”60 
Furthermore, Rock also noted that the Supreme Court has “[o]n 
numerous occasions . . . proceeded on the premise that the right to testify on 
one’s own behalf in defense to a criminal charge is a fundamental 
constitutional right.”61  Citing Harris v. New York,62 the Court noted that 
“[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to 
refuse to do so.”63  Rock articulated the constitutional foundations for a 
criminal defendant’s right to testify.  Today, however, courts are divided in 
interpreting how a defendant waives this constitutional right. 
III. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO TESTIFY 
In order to waive the constitutional right to counsel, there must be an 
affirmative record made showing that the defendant understood his right to 
counsel, and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that 
right.64  Put another way, a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel 
 
56.  Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)). 
57.  Id. at 52. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
60.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). 
61.  Id. at 53 n.10 (emphasis added). 
62.  401 U.S. 222 (1975). 
63.  Rock, 483 U.S. at 52-53 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225). 
64.  See supra Part II.A. 
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cannot be presumed from a silent record.65  The same is also true when a 
defendant wishes to plead guilty and waive his right to a jury trial.66  But 
most courts do not follow this line of reasoning when it comes to a 
defendant waiving right to testify.67  Instead, most courts hold that if the 
defendant himself does not make an objection on the record, it is presumed 
that he has waived his right to testify.68  Even though a defendant has the 
“ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the 
case,” including whether or not to testify,69 most courts simply make the 
assumption that a defendant has waived his constitutional right to testify 
absent any sort of record or confirmation that the defendant actually wished 
to waive this very important right. 
A. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
In United States v. Bernloehr,70 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that a criminal defendant’s waiver of his right to testify, like his waiver 
of other constitutional rights, should be made voluntarily and knowingly.71  
The Eighth Circuit, however, also held that an accused “must act 
affirmatively” when his defense counsel rests its case without calling the 
defendant to the stand.72  Interestingly, Bernloehr was decided the same 
year as Rock.73  In fact, in holding that an accused must affirmatively object 
if he would like to testify, the Eighth Circuit erroneously relied on United 
States v. Systems Architects, Inc.74 which, as previously discussed, was 
decided two years before Rock v. Arkansas held that the right to testify was 
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.75  Systems Architects, 
as well as the other cases cited by the Eighth Circuit in its holding,76 were 
all cases decided based on the fact that the right to testify was statutorily, 
 
65.  Id. 
66.  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see also Part II.B. 
67.  See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text 
68.  See supra note 7. 
69.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
70.  833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987). 
71.  Id. at 751. 
72.  Id. at 751-52 (quoting United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 375 (1st 
Cir. 1985)) (other internal citations omitted). 
73.  See supra notes 3, 5. 
74.  757 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1985). 
75.  See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987). 
76.  Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 751-52 (citing United States v. Sys. Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 
373, 375 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 n.9 (10th Cir. 1983) (right 
to testify not denied where, inter alia, “defendant made no objection to his attorney’s statements 
that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify”); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982) (“the 
person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness”) (emphasis added)). 
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rather than constitutionally, guaranteed.77  In support of its holding, 
Bernloehr even cited to 18 U.S.C. § 3481, the statutory grant of the right to 
testify, which states that the defendant must act affirmatively if he wishes to 
testify but is being prevented from doing so.78  Bernloehr, although based 
on an irrelevant law, still stands today, as it has not been overturned.  In 
fact, Bernloehr’s language is cited to by other circuit courts in holdings 
echoing the Eighth Circuit’s language.79 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
In United States v. Martinez,80 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that a defendant’s right to testify may be waived by his conduct.81  Again 
relying on Bernloehr’s incorrect holding, the Ninth Circuit held that “courts 
have no affirmative duty . . . to address a silent defendant and inquire 
whether he knowingly and intelligently waives the right to testify.”82  In 
United States v. Pino-Noriega,83 the Ninth Circuit further elaborated, 
stating that a defendant who wants to reject his attorney’s advice and take 
the stand may do so by insisting on testifying, speaking to the court, or 
discharging his lawyer.84  The court also stated that when a defendant 
remains silent in the face of his attorney’s decision not to call him as a 
witness, he waives the right to testify.85 
In a rather powerful dissent to Martinez, Judge Reinhardt found this 
holding incorrect.  Reinhardt noted that it is unwise to require a defendant 
to “ignore admonishments of counsel, interrupt the trial proceedings, and 
interject himself, uninvited, into the fray.”86  He further stated that 
defendants “are trained to be seen and not heard.  Court dictates are clear 
and authoritative; defendants who speak without invitation are not only 
silenced but threatened with the judicial contempt power.”87  Judge 
Reinhardt was extremely dissatisfied with the majority holding, and noted 
its inconsistencies, stating that “[t]his court unanimously concludes that the 
right to testify is a fundamental right that belongs to the defendant.  By 
 
77.  See id. 
78.  See supra note 46; see also supra note 75. 
79.  See infra Parts III.B-D. 
80.  883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989). 
81.  Id. at 759. 
82.  Id. at 760 (citing United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751-52 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
83.  189 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). 
84.  Id. at 1095. 
85.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
86.  Martinez, 883 F.2d at 770 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
87.  Id. 
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definition, the majority concedes that only the defendant, himself, may 
make the decision, and that he does not cede it to his attorney by electing to 
be represented by counsel.”88  However, “what the majority giveth with one 
hand, it taketh away with the other.”89  Judge Reinhardt’s statement referred 
to the fact that although the decision on whether or not to testify belongs 
with only the defendant himself, the defendant’s attorney in Martinez 
explicitly testified that he made the decision that his defendant would not 
take the stand.90 
C. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
United States v. Teague,91 held that a defendant’s right to testify is 
fundamental and personal to the defendant himself, such that it may not be 
effectively waived by counsel against the defendant’s will, and that the 
defendant in Teague was prejudiced by the denial of this right to testify, 
thus requiring a new trial.92  The Eleventh Circuit stated that there are 
certain tactical decisions made by defense attorneys over the course of their 
representation of defendants that “implicitly involve the waiver of 
constitutional rights” but do not require the defendant’s consent.93  But 
“[w]here an inherently personal right of fundamental importance is 
involved, the defendant’s [personal] consent is required.”94  Teague noted 
several inherently personal rights with such fundamental importance that 
only the defendant, not counsel, may waive them, including the right to 
plead guilty,95 the right to a jury trial,96 the right to counsel,97 and the right 
to an appeal.98  The Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s right to testify is 
 
88.  Id. at 762. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 761 (citing to Martinez’s attorney’s testimony during post-trial proceedings, Judge 
Reinhardt notes that; 
Bobby Martinez sought to testify in his own defense.  He repeatedly asked his attorney 
to put him on the stand, but he was refused the opportunity to testify in absolute terms.  
“I told Mr. Martinez that I was not going to call him as a witness in his defense.  He 
expressed to me the desire to testify; and I said no way, that I thought it was suicidal 
for him to testify, and it would be an error in judgment; and that was it.  I just made 
the decision he was not going to testify, I refused to call him, and that was the way it 
went down.” 
91.  908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 (11th Cir. 1991). 
92.  Id. at 752. 
93.  Id. at 758 (citing United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
94.  Id. 
95.  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
96.  Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942). 
97.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
98.  Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963). 
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no different, citing Rock’s holding in that the right to testify is rooted in the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.99 
Teague noted that Rock’s holding states that Sixth Amendment granted 
the accused “personally” the right to make his defense.100  Rock’s holding, 
in turn, cited Faretta v. California,101 which held that the right of the 
defendant to conduct his own defense is the defendant’s own choice to 
make.102  The defendant’s choice “must be honored out of that respect for 
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”103  Teague then reasoned 
that implicit in Faretta’s holding is the notion that when the government 
brings an individual to face criminal charges, “that respect for the individual 
which is the lifeblood of the law” requires that the defendant be allowed, if 
he so desires, to speak directly to his accusers, at which point the court and 
jury will decide his fate.104 
The fact that a defendant has failed to speak up, out of turn, and object 
on the record was “of little, if any, probative value in determining whether 
the decision that the defendant would not testify was the defendant’s own 
decision.”105  In support, the Eleventh Circuit offered a logical and 
compelling argument, stating: 
In affording a criminal defendant a fundamental right to counsel, 
the Constitution recognizes that criminal defendants are often 
unschooled in the intricacies of our criminal justice system, and 
that without the assistance of counsel, will likely suffer an 
overwhelming disadvantage in presenting their defense.  The 
defendant relies on his counsel to understand the process of the 
trial itself and to recognize the proper time for the defendant to be 
called as a witness.  The defendant may not realize until after the 
jury has retired to deliberate that the proper time for his testimony 
has passed.  Furthermore, once a defendant elects to take 
advantage of his right to counsel, he is told that all further 
communications with the court and the prosecutor should be made 
through his attorney.  Aside from any testimony he may give at 
pre-trial hearings or during trial, a defendant is not permitted to 
speak directly to the court.  In fact, in the interests of decorum and 
 
99.  Teague, 908 F.2d at 758; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987). 
100.  Teague, 908 F.2d at 758. 
101.  422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
102.  Teague, 908 F.2d at 759; see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. 
103.  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted). 
104.  Teague, 908 F.2d at 759 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834). 
105.  Id. (citing Foster v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a 
defendant had forfeited his right to be present at trial by interrupting proceedings after warning by 
judge, even though defendant’s behavior was neither abusive nor violent)). 
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the smooth administration of justice, defendants who speak out of 
turn at their own trials are quickly reprimanded, and sometimes 
banned from the courtroom, by the court.  It would be anomalous 
to consider the right to counsel of fundamental importance because 
of the common lack of understanding of the trial process by 
defendants, and to require a defendant to rely on his attorney to be 
his sole spokesperson in the courtroom, while at the same time 
holding that by failing to speak out at the proper time a defendant 
has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of a personal 
right of fundamental importance such as the right to testify.106 
Teague makes a sound argument.  Disappointingly, however, this 
holding was vacated and the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en 
banc.107  The court then filed another opinion affirming the defendant’s 
fundamental right to testify, although framing the issue (defense counsel’s 
alleged refusal to let Teague testify) as one of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.108  Alaska’s Supreme Court, however, found this erroneous, and 
for good reason.  Characterizing the issue as one of ineffective assistance of 
counsel “does not provide the proper framework for reviewing the 
constitutional violation at issue.”109  The defendant’s personal decision 
regarding whether or not to testify implicates a defendant’s Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, not merely the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.110 
D. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSITION 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has also weighed in on the matter 
several times.  Unfortunately, North Dakota’s decisions, much like the 
Ninth Circuit’s, rely on the incorrect Bernloehr holding from the Eighth 
Circuit.  In State v. Antoine,111 North Dakota held that a defendant has the 
duty to act affirmatively in circumstances when the defendant did not 
voluntarily agree on the decision not to testify.112  The decision stated that 
“if the defendant wants to testify, he can reject his attorney’s tactical 
decision by insisting on testifying, speaking to the court, or discharging his 
 
106.  Id. at 759-60.  
107.  United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 (11th 
Cir. 1991). 
108.  United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1992). 
109.  LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217, 220 (Alaska 1991). 
110.  Id 
111.  1997 ND 100, 564 N.W.2d 637. 
112.  Id. ¶ 6, 564 N.W.2d at 639 (citing United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751  
(8th Cir. 1987)). 
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lawyer.”113  The North Dakota Supreme Court also found the facts in 
Antoine “analogous to Bernloehr,” which, as previously mentioned, is 
based on the now irrelevant statutory grant of a criminal defendant’s right 
to testify, rather than the constitutionally guaranteed right to do so.114 
Ten years later, North Dakota decided State v. Mulske.115  In the 
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that “if an accused desires 
to exercise her constitutional right to testify[,] the accused must act 
affirmatively and express to the court her desire to do so at the appropriate 
time or a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right is deemed to have 
occurred.”116  These decisions are incorrect in that they cite to cases that are 
no longer on point nor relevant.  These decisions also do nothing to rebut 
Teague’s clear and succinct reasoning as to why a defendant does not know 
the “appropriate time” to speak to the court, nor the fact that the defendant 
is often not allowed to even speak to the court in the first place.117 
E. OTHER COURTS 
There are a few jurisdictions that hold that a defendant’s fundamental 
right to testify cannot be presumed from a silent record.  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals “regard[s] as highly questionable the proposition 
that a defendant’s failure to object at trial to counsel’s refusal to allow him 
to take the stand constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s constitutional right 
to testify on his own behalf.”118  After all, it is the defendant, not his lawyer 
or the state, who will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.119 
In some jurisdictions, in order for a defendant to waive his or her right 
to testify, the trial court must make an on-the-record inquiry into whether 
the defendant understands his or her right and wishes to waive it.120  Other 
jurisdictions have held that an on-the-record inquiry, though not required, is 
advisable.121  In United States v. DiSalvo,122 the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
 
113.  Id. (quoting United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
114.  Id. ¶ 8, 564 N.W.2d at 639; see also supra Part III.A. 
115.  2007 ND 43, 729 N.W.2d 129. 
116.  Id. ¶ 6, 729 N.W.2d at 131 (citing Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 752). 
117.  See supra Part III.C. 
118.  See United States v. Vargas, 920 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1990). 
119.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975). 
120.  State v. Tuplin, 901 A.2d 792, 797 (Me. 2006) (citing People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 
507-08 (Colo. 1984); LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217, 222 (Alaska 1991); Tachibana v. State, 900 
P.2d 1293, 1303 (Haw. 1995)). 
121.  Tuplin, 901 A.2d at 797 (citing State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579, 598 (Ariz. 1995); 
Barron v. State, 452 S.E.2d 504, 505 n.2 (Ga. 1995); Phillips v. State, 782 P.2d 381, 382 (Nev. 
1989); Commonwealth v. Siciliano, 471 N.E.2d 1359, 1362 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)). 
122.  726 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
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Martinez that a defendant waives his right to testify if he does not 
affirmatively object, instead agreeing with Judge Reinhardt’s powerful 
dissent.123  In order to fully protect the fundamental constitutional rights of 
a criminal defendant, “[i]t appears that the only clear way to establish 
whether the defendant is waiving his right to testify is to require trial judges 
to establish on the record that the defendant understands his right to testify 
and is waiving that right.”124 
IV. WHY THIS AREA OF CRIMINAL LAW SHOULD BE EXAMINED 
BY THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court must examine a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
right to testify for several reasons.  The inconsistencies in circuit courts’ 
interpretations of Rock v. Arkansas are being exacerbated by the Eighth 
Circuit’s reliance upon the outdated and no longer relevant statutory 
granting of the right of criminal defendants to testify.  Other circuit courts, 
as well as North Dakota’s Supreme Court, have since relied on the incorrect 
Eighth Circuit precedent, further compounding the problem.  In addition to 
this, there are also a number of practical considerations regarding a criminal 
defendant’s right to testify. 
A. THE IMPACT A DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY HAS ON THE JURY 
A criminal defendant’s testimony can have a tremendous impact on the 
jury.  It is important that defendants alone should hold the “ultimate 
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding [his or her] 
case,” including whether or not to testify on their own behalves.125  While 
defense counsel bears the primary burden of advising the defendant of his 
right to testify or not to testify and the strategic implications of each choice, 
the decision on whether or not to testify ultimately rests with the 
defendant.126 
A defendant’s failure to become a witness might well be considered as 
a circumstance unfavorable to the defendant, which is why it is necessary to 
instruct the jury not to consider it unfavorable.127  The very fact that a jury 
could consider unfavorable the defendant not testifying on his own behalf, 
thus necessitating an instruction on the matter, must raise suspicions 
regarding the actual prejudice it creates for a defendant.  In fact, actual 
 
123.  Id. at 598; see also supra Part III.B. 
124.  LaVigne v. State, 788 P.2d 52, 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990), conviction rev’d, 812 P.2d 
217, 222 (Alaska 1991). 
125.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
126.  United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992). 
127.  State v. Wisnewski, 102 N.W. 883, 884 (N.D. 1905). 
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unfairness often results when a defendant does not testify because the 
defendant himself is often the most effective witness for the defense.128  
“The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as 
the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.”129  
Furthermore, juries, despite limiting instructions, are highly prone to infer 
guilt from a criminal defendant’s failure to take the stand.130 
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A number of practical considerations also exist regarding whether or 
not a defendant must affirmatively waive his right to testify on the record.  
These practical considerations emphasize the importance of a truly 
informed waiver and consistency in protecting fundamental rights.  Courts 
often use the excuse of not wanting to pry into the attorney-client 
relationship in support of not determining on the record whether a 
defendant is knowingly and intelligently relinquishing his right to testify.131  
This argument is unpersuasive. 
A simple on-the-record inquiry at trial may be done outside the 
presence of the jury and would take up very little time in court.  This small 
inquiry by the court encourages, rather than undermines, the attorney-client 
relationship.  In asking the defendant if he wishes to give up his right to 
testify, both the client and his attorney have a chance to rethink the matter.  
If the defendant is in any way unsure about testifying, he and his attorney 
have another chance to effectively communicate with each other and 
discuss this very important constitutional right, as well as anything else they 
may wish to discuss.132 
In any event, this small inquiry at trial does far less damage, if any, to 
the attorney-client relationship than an entire post-trial hearing on the 
matter, which forces the client to waive his attorney-client privilege in order 
to testify on the matter.133  Further, without any indication in the trial record 
 
128.  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
129.  Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). 
130.  See, e.g., McCormick, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 89 (2d ed. 1972). 
131.  See Case Comment, Criminal Law—Right to Testify—Seventh Circuit Holds That 
Defendant’s Waiver of the Right to Testify Was Valid Despite District Court’s Failure to Engage 
in an On-The-Record Colloquy Regarding the Decision, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1663-64 
(2008). 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. at 1666 (explaining that judges can briefly explain to defendants the right to testify 
and ask a few “well-crafted questions” about the decision of testifying.  Doing this puts enough 
evidence on the record to uphold the waiver against a challenge while carefully avoiding prying 
into the substance of the attorney-client relationship.  When the record is devoid of such 
information, this leaves room for an intrusive, detailed inquiry into the timing and substance 
between the attorney and defendant at a post-trial hearing.  Defendants must waive the attorney-
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that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify, 
reviewing courts will have a difficult time proving that a waiver actually 
occurred. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
It is this Note’s recommendation that trial courts should seek an on-the-
record waiver of a defendant’s right to testify in order to ensure that this 
waiver is indeed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  An inquiry by the 
court would prevent the unwitting relinquishment of this right by a 
defendant who is either unaware of his control over the decision or not 
sufficiently sophisticated to raise the issue with the court.134  By doing this, 
a record would be made that a defendant has been notified about this right 
that he himself controls. 
The Supreme Court has made on-the-record statements mandatory for 
waiving other personal rights, such as the right to a jury trial when a 
defendant pleads guilty and the right to an attorney.135  These on-the-record 
statements can promote communications between the attorney and client 
before and during trial.136  Effective attorney-client communication before 
and at trial, along with courts making an on-the-record colloquy of the 
defendant’s knowledge of his right to testify, as well as an informed 
decision to waive that right, all ensure that defendants have no doubt as to 
their rights and the implications of waiving them.  This prevents a muddled 
appeals process with an ambiguous record.  It also prevents the defendant 
from feeling like his attorney did not effectively explain his right to him and 
unilaterally waived it without the defendant’s consent.  At the very least, a 
trial court’s on-the-record inquiry will serve as a quick reminder to both the 
attorney and client that they need to communicate with each other regarding 
the decision of whether the defendant should testify. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are several reasons why the defendant’s right to testify is an 
issue that needs readdressing by the Supreme Court.  First, there is 
confusion among circuit and district courts in how to properly ensure that a 
defendant is making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of this 
 
client privilege and attorneys must breach their confidentiality obligations at these hearings.  The 
attorney and client are in the “uncomfortable” position of being directly in opposition of  
one-another, when a few simple questions at trial could prevent complicated and unnecessary 
proceedings and appeals). 
134.  United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 764 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
135.  See supra Parts II.A-B. 
136.  See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
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right.  Some district courts hold that an on-the-record inquiry is required, 
while a minority of other courts have stated that such an approach is highly 
advisable.  The majority of courts, however, hold that there is no 
requirement for a court to do so.  The majority of courts fail to recognize 
the inconsistency in their approaches in determining waiver of 
constitutional rights.  The right to counsel and the right to a jury trial must 
be affirmatively waived on the record, while the right to testify, which is 
arguably the most important of these rights, is presumed to be waived 
absent any indication that the defendant actually wishes to do so.  Even 
more disturbing is the reliance by some circuit courts on outdated and 
irrelevant law regarding the statutory grant of the right to testify, rather than 
the guaranteed constitutional right found in Rock v. Arkansas.  The issue is 
ripe for consideration, and the Supreme Court would be very wise in 
reconsidering this extremely important issue. 
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